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TERRY STOP OR ARREST? THE WASHINGTON COURT
ATTEMPTS A DISTINCTION-State v. Williams, 102 Wn. 2d 733,
689 P.2d 1065 (1984).
In State v. Williams1 the Washington Supreme Court attempted to set
forth specific criteria for determining when a temporary detention exceeds
the bounds of a Terry stop 2 and becomes an arrest, with the concomitant
probable cause requirement. 3 The court relied on both the fourth amendment and article 1, section 7 of the state constitution as the bases for its
standards. The holding, however, is fact-specific, and the court's discussion
of the permissible scope and intensity of an investigatory stop does not
adequately establish guidelines for the police to apply in a future situation.
Further, because the court did not ground its decision firmly in state law, the
limits of an investigatory stop in Washington may be modified by future
federal rulings.

I. BACKGROUND
A.

Terry Stop or Arrest?

Both the fourth amendment and article 1, section 7 of the Washington
State Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. A
search or seizure perpetrated without a warrant is per se unreasonable 4
unless it is within one of the "jealously and carefully drawn" 5 exceptions to
the rule. Those exceptions arise when society's interest in ensuring the
safety of others or preventing the destruction of evidence outweighs the
6
individual's interest in liberty and privacy
One of the specified exceptions to the rule is the "Terry stop," adopted
by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio.7 Terry allows a limited
detention when the police have an articulable suspicion of criminal activity,
and it allows a pat-down search for weapons when police have a reasonable
1. 102 Wn. 2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984).
2. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3. 102 Wn. 2d at 740-41, 689 P.2d at 1069-70. This Note does not analyze the other issue in the
case, whether the car impoundment and later "inventory" search were justified.
4. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
5. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,759 (1979) (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,
499 (1958)).
6. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967).
7. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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belief that the detained person may be armed. 8 The Terry Court justified this
exception on the grounds that the detention is less intrusive than an arrest,
and the search is necessary to protect the officer's safety.9 The Court further
explained in Adams v. Williams1 ° that the Terry stop also allows brief stops
of "suspicious" individuals to determine the individual's identity or to
"maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information." ' I Thus, brief questioning may accompany the Terry pat-down,
without warrant or probable cause. The officer need not fear danger, but
2
must have an articulable suspicion of wrongdoing. 1
The Court recently broadened the scope of Terry to include the seizure of
personal possessions in United States v. Place.13 In a statement unnecessary to thejudgment, 14 the Court concluded that Terry also allows the police
to temporarily detain personal possessions for purposes of investigation.
8. Id. at 30. The articulable or reasonable suspicion standard was further clarified in United States
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), where the objective facts and circumstantial evidence provided sufficient
basis to justify stopping a vehicle suspected of transporting illegal aliens. The Cortez Court held that the
behavior of the government must be analyzed in reference to the "totality of the circumstances-the
whole picture," and that the officer "must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity." Id. at 417-18. "An investigatory stop must be justified
by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal
activity." Id. at 417.
9. 392 U.S. at 22-27.
10. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
11. Id. at 146.
In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), the Court iterated that Terry does not go so far as to
allow a suspect to be picked up, taken to the station, and questioned without probable cause. Any
detention for custodial interrogation requires probable cause.
The Burger Court has continued to grapple with the permissible scope of police activity in a Terry
stop, setting guidelines on the purpose, amount of physical intrusion, and duration. In Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491 (1983), the Court held that the stop was longer than necessary to accomplish the allowed
purpose and that, although the permissible length will vary with the facts, the seizure must relate to the
reason for the investigation. The police must accomplish the investigation by the least intrusive means
available. Id. at 500.
In Michigan v. Long, 103 S.Ct. 3469 (1983), the Court broadened Terry, holding that a Terry patdown search for weapons may extend beyond the person to the passenger compartment of the suspect's
vehicle, stressing the risk to the officers. The Court referred to statistics that 30% of all police shootings
occurred when the officer approached a suspect seated in a car. 103 S. Ct. at 3479-80 n. 13 (citing Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n.3 (1972)). The Court emphasized that the suspicion of danger must be
reasonable and that the suspect must have access to the car.
12. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Terry, warned that "[tlhere have been powerful hydraulic
pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees
and give the police the upper hand." 392 U.S. at 39. Many of the Terry modifications reflect the
continuing strength of those pressures.
13. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
14. The Court determined that although the seizure of personal possessions was reasonable, the
time involved, 90 minutes, exceeded the permissible length of an investigative seizure, id. at 2645-46;
however, it declined to state what would be reasonable.

Terry Stop or Arrest
Although no suggestion of danger was present in Place, the exigency of
removal or destruction of evidence justified the seizure. 15
Terry v. Ohio and its progeny have thus created a two-tiered search and
seizure law.16 The law allows police to temporarily detain an individual
without probable cause for arrest. Such a temporary detention is not
unreasonable under the fourth amendment because of its brevity and minimal intrusion, and because it protects police officers and prevents the
destruction of evidence. The courts' recurring problem is in determining
when a detention is so intrusive that it becomes an arrest subject to the more
exacting probable cause requirement. 17 The courts receive little help from
the search and seizure provisions in either the Washington or the federal
constitution. Both provisions are very general, they cover a broad range of
government activity, and they cannot easily be reduced to "complete order
8
and harmony"
B.

Federal vs. State Law

For many years the Washington Supreme Court followed federal decisions and did not attempt to develop any independent state constitutional
law. 19 Since the Burger Court has been restricting individual rights in the
15. Until Place, such exigency was grounds for search or seizure without a warrant but only in
connection with a valid arrest for which there was probable cause. Cf. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798 (1982) (warrantless search of auto for drugs permissible because of inherent mobility of auto).
16. Some commentators see the search and seizure law as three-tiered. See Latzer, Royer, Profiles,
and the Emerging Three-TierApproach to the FourthAmendment, 11 AM. J. CmIu.L. 149 (1983). The
first tier in such an approach includes all the police-citizen contacts that do not rise to the level of a
search or seizure because they are minimally intrusive. The second tier is the Terry stop, subject to the
reasonable suspicion requirement, and the third tier is an arrest, subject to the more stringent probable
cause requirement. Former Justice Potter Stewart developed the concept in United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544,553-54 (1980), and the fourjustice plurality in Royer appears to adopt the idea in dictum.
460 U.S. at 497-98.
17. Many appellate decisions in search and seizure cases deal with the difficulty of establishing a
bright line standard. For the relative merits of a bright line approach compare Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,409-39 (1974) (definite guidelines forpolice conduct
are required because of the tremendous discretionary power of the individual officers) with Alschuler,
Bright Line Fever and the FourthAmendment, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 227, 231 (1984) (an attempt to
establish bright line search and seizure rules would result only in an "unmanageable multiplicity of
rules-more bright lines than the human eye can keep in view").
18. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,483 (1971). The Court in Coolidge acknowledged
the difficulty of establishing a "single coherent analytical framework" for fourth amendment decisions.
Id. Because each application of search and seizure law is fact-specific, the appellate courts act
essentially as super trial courts.
19. For an excellent summary and discussion of this trend, see Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a
FederalSystem: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7
U.P.S. L. REv. 491 (1984). See also Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 H~Av. L. REv. 489 (1977); Linde, E Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory andState Courts, 18
GA. L. REv. 165 (1984).
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last fifteen years, however, 20 the Washington court has turned to the history
and text of the state constitution to provide extra protection for individual
rights. 21 In recent years the Washington court has specifically held that

article 1, section 722 of the state constitution grants more protection to
individuals than the fourth amendment 23 in several areas. 24
A state court's analysis of the protection guaranteed by its own constitution or laws may be either state-specific or federally oriented. 25 A statespecific analysis relies not on any federal precedent but upon differences in
the wording of the state constitution, differences in the intent of the framers,
20. See Utter, supra note 19, at 499 n.28.
21. The Bill of Rights, as applied to the states by incorporation in the fourteenth amendment, is
recognized as the minimum standard of individual liberties. See Alderwood Assocs. v. Environmental
Council, 96 Wn. 2d 230, 237, 635 P.2d 108, 112 (1981); Brennan, supranote 19, at 491-95. The concept
of federalism has been applied by Washington, as well as many other states, to find a basis in the state
constitutions and laws for stronger individual rights. See Developments in the Law-The Interpretation
of State Constitutions, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324, 1371-99 (1982), for a discussion of this trend. See also
infra note 24.
22. Article 1, § 7 of the Washington State Constitution provides, "No person shall be disturbed in
his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."
23. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
24. For example, in State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn. 2d 814, 821, 676 P.2d 419, 424 (1984), the court
held that an arrest for a misdemeanor does not permit warrantless entry into the arrestee's home without
an articulable threat to safety, likelihood of escape, or danger of the destruction of evidence. The court
found independent state grounds for its decision after the United States Supreme Court reversed an
earlier decision in the same case, based upon fourth amendment grounds. State v. Chrisman, 94 Wn. 2d
711, 619 P.2d 971 (1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
In State v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686, 698-99, 674 P.2d 1240, 1247-48 (1983), the court held that
warrantless searches incident to arrest may extend only to areas within the physical control of the
arrestee, and are limited to removing weapons or preventing the destruction of evidence. The court
refused to follow New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), in which the United State Supreme Court
held that the entire inside of a car may be searched without a warrant when the driver is validly arrested.
For a discussion of Ringer, see Note, New Limits on Police Vehicle Searches in Washington, 60 WASH.
L. REV. 177 (1984).
In State v. White, 97 Wn. 2d 92, 108-10, 640 P.2d 1061, 1070-71 (1982), the court rejected the
rationale of Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is
deterrence. The court reasoned that the exclusionary rule exists not for deterrence but to ensure the
individual right to privacy; the exclusionary rule in Washington brooks no recognition of an independent
source doctrine or inevitable evidence rule because an individual's right to privacy has no express
limitations such as those embodied in the fourth amendment.
In State v. Simpson, 95 Wn. 2d 170, 180-81, 622 P.2d 1199, 1206 (1980), the court held that an
individual has automatic standing to contest an illegal search or seizure, specifically rejecting the
holding of United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
Finally, in State v. Hehman, 90 Wn. 2d 45, 47-49,578 P.2d 527,528-29 (1978), the court held that an
individual charged with a minor traffic violation may not be put under custodial arrest, rejecting United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1978).
25. See Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 1384-94.
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and specific state cases. A federally oriented approach concentrates on the
status of federal law, applies the reasoning of federal decisions or dissents,
but reaches a different result than the majority of federal decisions. Many
decisions involve an approach somewhere between these two extremes,
26
relying partly on state law and partly on federal precedent.
Courts using a federally oriented approach have frequently been overturned by the United States Supreme Court because they inadequately
justified their departure from federal precedent. 27 In Michiganv. Long28 the
Supreme Court explained that a state result that goes beyond federal
precedent in establishing individual rights would be free from federal
review if the state decision indicated "clearly and expressly" that it was
"based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent [state]
grounds." 29 The exemption from federal review applies also to a state
decision that followed only federal precedent and federal reasoning, so long
as the court clearly stated (1) that the federal law was being used only to
guide the interpretation of state law, and (2) that the federal doctrine did not
compel the result. 30 If, on the other hand, the court uses federal law in its
reasoning, and the "adequacy and independence of any possible state law
ground is not clear from the face of the opinion," then the United States
31
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the result.
II.

THE WILLIAMS DECISION

A.

"The Facts of the Case"

John L. Williams was convicted of second degree burglary and first
degree theft after the trial court refused to suppress evidence obtained in a
search of Williams' car after his detention by police. 32 The court of appeals
affirmed the conviction, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the evidence found in the car was inadmissible on two grounds.
First, the car search was conducted pursuant to an illegal seizure of the
26. Id. at 1385.
27. See, e.g., State v. Chrisman, 94 Wn. 2d 711, 619 P.2d 971 (1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 1 (1982),
discussed supranote 24.
28. 103 S. Ct 3469 (1983).
29. Id. at 3476. The Michigan court relied entirely on federal law in its analysis, making only two
brief references to its state constitution. Id. at 3474 n.3. Recognizing the need for doctrinal consistency
when "sensitive issues of federal-state relations are involved," id. at 3475, and acknowledging its
"[riespect for the independence of state courts," id., the Court outlined a consistent approach for
determining when a state decision, on purported state grounds, would be free from federal review.
30. Id. at 3476.
31. Id.
32. 102 Wn. 2d 733, 734, 689 P.2d 1065, 1066 (1984).
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suspect. Second, the warrantless impoundment and inventory of the car's
33
contents were improper.
On April 7, 1981, police received a signal from a silent burglar alarm in a
residence. When an officer arrived at the residence he saw a vehicle begin to
drive away. He blocked the vehicle's path, and at gun point ordered the
driver to turn off the car, throw out the keys, and raise his hands. When a
second officer arrived, also with gun drawn, they ordered the driver out of
the car, handcuffed him, pat-searched him, read him his rights, and put him
in the back of the police car.34 After entering the house and determining that
a burglary had occurred, they asked the suspect what he was doing there.
When his answer did not satisfy them, they took him to the police station. 5
The police did not ask Williams for any identification until he was at the
36
police station.
The police impounded Williams' car and, during an inventory of its
contents, they found a jewelry box partially hidden under the front seat.
They opened the box and found jewelry. The police then sealed the car and
37
transported it to the police yard until a search warrant could be obtained.
B.

The Majority Decision

The court reversed Williams' conviction primarily because his detention
exceeded the bounds of a Terry stop. 38 The stop therefore became an arrest.
Before the investigation of the house and Williams' car the police had no
probable cause to believe that Williams had committted a crime; thus, the
arrest was illegal.
The court pointed out that the fourth amendment requires that two
inquiries be made into an investigative stop: first, whether the "initial
interference with the suspect's freedom of movement [was] justified at its
inception"; and second, whether the detention was related in its "intensity
and scope" to those circumstances that justified the initial interference. 39
The court did not argue that the original detention was improper, considering the suspect's proximity to the house where the alarm had so recently
sounded. The court held, however, that the scope and intensity of the
33. The Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Simpson, 95 Wn. 2d 170,622 P.2d 1199 (1980), set
forth the requirements for lawful impoundment. A car may be impounded if: (1) it was stolen or used in
the commission of a felony and is therefore evidence; (2) the removal of the car is necessary for traffic or
safety reasons and the defendant has no way to arrange for its removal; or (3) the auto was used to commit
a traffic violation for which the state specifically allows impoundment. Id. at 189, 622 P.2d at 1211.
34. 102 Wn. 2d at 734-35, 689 P.2d at 1066.
35. Id. at 735, 689 P.2d at 1066-67.
36. Id. at 740, 689 P.2d at 1069.
37. Id. at 735, 689 P.2d at 1067.
38. Id. at 736, 689 P.2d at 1067.
39. Id. at 739, 689 P.2d at 1069.
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detention did not satisfy the Terry requirements that an investigative stop be
temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to dispel or confirm the officer's
suspicion, and that the least intrusive means available be used. Specifically,
the Washington court evaluated (1) the purpose of the stop, (2) the degree of
physical intrusion, and (3) the duration of the stop, and determined that
Williams' seizure was so intrusive that it amounted to an arrest and therefore
40
required probable cause.
Considering first the purpose of the stop, the court concluded that the
officer's purpose did not fit within the narrow Terry and Adams v. Williams
object, of temporary detention to determine the suspect's identity and
reason for being in the area. Rather, the purpose for detaining Williams was
to prevent his disappearance while the officer determined if a crime had
41
been committed.
Second, the court determined that the degree of physical intrusion was
excessive, considering the alleged crime and the behavior of the defendant.
The degree of force-drawn guns, handcuffs, and seclusion-was excessive since the circumstances gave no indication that the suspect was
dangerous. 42 The court also pointed out that any such detention should be
related to an investigation of the suspect, that "such [a] relationship is
essential," 43 and that in this case the police were investigating a crime, not a
suspect. A citizen's right to be free of governmental interference requires
that any interference, absent a dangerous situation, be brief and be directed
only to determining the suspect's identity, reason for being in the area of the
crime, and possible involvement in the crime. 44 Williams was not asked
why he was in the area until after he was handcuffed and placed in the police
car, and he was not asked his identity until he was taken to the police station.
Finally, the court held that the duration of Williams' detention was
excessive.45 Considering the intrusive nature of the police activities, the
court concluded that those activities constituted an arrest,4 6 and that at the
40. Id. at 740-41, 689 P.2d at 1069-70.
41. Id. at 740, 689 P.2d at 1069.
42. Id. The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the allowable degree of force when
distinguishing a stop from an arrest. See Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure; The Concepts of
"Stop" and "'Arrest," 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 771, 814-17 (1982). However, the lower federal courts have
considered the question and upheld stops at gunpoint when the threat of force was necessary to protect
the officer from apparent danger. See id. at 816 n.252, and cases cited therein. The Ninth Circuit, in
United States v. Strickler, 490 E2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974), held that encircling a suspect's car and ordering
him out at gun point constituted an arrest. The armed approach to the car, whose occupants had been
commanded to raise their hands, could not be equated to a Teny stop. Id. at 380.
43. 102 Wn. 2d at 741, 689 P.2d at 1069.
44. Id. at 740-41, 689 P.2d. at 1069-70.
45. Id. at 741, 689 P.2d. at 1070.
46. Id. The decision thus overrules in part State v. Byers, 88 Wn. 2d 1, 6, 559 P.2d 1334, 1336
(1977) (Byers blurred the distinction between an arrest and a Terry stop, suggesting that an arrest occurs
whenever the suspect is not free to go). 102 Wn. 2d at 741 n.5, 689 P.2d at 1070 n.5.
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time of the arrest there was no probable cause to believe a crime had been
committed. The police had nothing beyond physical proximity to connect
the suspect to the potential crime. Because the seizure of Williams was thus
unreasonable, the resulting seizure and search of Williams' auto was like47
wise unreasonable.
The majority also pointed out that its conclusion is required not only by
the Terry interpretation of the fourth amendment, but independently by
article 1, section 7 of the state constitution. In an apparent move to preclude
Supreme Court review, the court, without analysis, stated that "the lan48
guage of Const. art 1, § 7 forbids police seizures of this nature."
C.

The Williams Dissent

Justice Dimmick's dissent noted that the majority offers no clear
guidelines to the police on how to proceed in future situations. 49 Further,
Justice Dimmick argued that the police actions were reasonable considering the totality of the circumstances; 50 occasionally a longer than momentary freeze of the situation is allowed, when the detention is collateral to an
investigation. 51

The dissent distinguished those cases where the detention itself was the
investigative tool; a lengthy detention in that situation is unjustified because
it no longer serves only to maintain the status quo. 52 Williams was not
interrogated during the detention, nor was his car searched at that time; he
was merely held while the police determined that a crime had been committed. When he then had no plausible explanation for his presence at the
scene, the officers arrested him.
III.

EFFECT OF THE DECISION

The effect of the Williams decision is unclear for several reasons. First,
the decision is essentially one of fact-what is "reasonable" behavior on
the part of a police officer when confronted with a particular situation? In
order to qualify as a Terry stop the scope and duration of the detention must
47.
48.

102 Wn. 2d at 742, 689 P.2d at 1070.
Id. at 742, 689 P.2d at 1070; see supra Part LB.

49. Id. at 744, 689 P.2d at 1071 (Dimmick, J., dissenting); see supra note 17.
50. Id. at 745, 689 P.2d at 1072 (Dimmick, J., dissenting). The basic difference between the
majority and dissent, on the issue of the propriety of the detention, is a different interpretation of the
reasonableness of the police behavior, rather than a different interpretation of the fourth amendment or
article 1,§ 7.
51. Id. Justice Dimmick referred for support of this position to Michigan v. Long, 103 S.Ct. 3469
(1983), and Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
52. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721
(1968).
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not be overly intrusive, but the court cannot establish a bright line for
53
guidance when each encounter is different.
The Williams court analyzed the scope and intrusiveness of Williams'
detention in light of three criteria: duration, intensity, and purpose. It found
that Williams' treatment was faulty under all three criteria. The court did
not, however, point out the relative importance of the factors, or whether
violating any one or two factors would be impermissibly intrusive. Furthermore, when considering the purpose of the stop, the court purported to
create a distinction between the investigation of a crime and the investigation of a suspect. The opinion, however, does not clearly explain that subtle
difference. Both the police and the trial courts will have difficulty distinguishing between a detention to hold an individual while the police
determine whether a crime was committed, and a detention to hold an
individual to determine whether that person committed a crime.
The second problem regarding the future effect of the Williams decision
is that the composition of the Washington Supreme Court has changed
significantly since the opinion was rendered in October 1984. Neither
Justice Rosellini, who wrote the opinion, nor Justice Dimmick, who
authored the dissent, remain on the court. Of the nine justices who ruled on
Williams only five remain, three of whom signed the dissent. 54 The change
in the court, coupled with the factual nature of the decision, indicate that on
slightly different facts in a future case the court could reach a contrary
result.
Third, the majority opinion may not meet the Michigan v. Long
requirements. 55 The decision is clearly federally oriented. 56 The entire
57
analysis of the validity of the detention is based upon federal case law,
without even a reference to State v. White, 58 in which the Washington court
adopted Terry v. Ohio and explained its application under article 1, section
7.59 Although the court states that "[m]oreover, our conclusion is independently required by article 1, section 7 of our state constitution," 60 the state
analysis is limited to citing State v. Chrisman,61 State v. Ringer,62 and State
53. See supra note 17.
54. The three remaining justices who concurred in the dissent were Brachtenbach, Dolliver, and
Dore. The two remaining justices who concurred in the majority opinion were Pearson and Utter. The
other two concurrences were by Williams, C.J., and Cunningham, J., Pro-Tem. Justice Anderson did
not participate in the decision.
55. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
56. See supranotes 25-26 and accompanying text.
57. 102 Wn. 2d at 736-41, 689 P.2d at 1068-70.
58. 97 Wn. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982).
59. Id. at 105-06, 640 P.2d at 1068-69.
60. 102 Wn. 2d at 741, 689 P.2d at 1070.
61. 100 Wn. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984).
62. 100 Wn. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983).
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v. Simpson 63 for the proposition that article 1, section 7 "provides height-

ened protection to our citizens' privacy rights. "64 In Chrisman,Ringer,and
Simpson the court analyzed the particular facts and issues in terms of
Washington law, relying on Washington precedent, and discussing the
historical underpinnings of the different language in the two constitutions.
Three possible conclusions can be drawn regarding the adequacy of the
state analysis in Williams: first, that the bare statement that "[m]oreover,
our conclusion is independently required" is satisfactory under Michigan v.
Long as a clear expresion of "bona fide separate, adequate, and independent
grounds"; 65 second, that the satisfactory state analysis in the prior cases is
adequately incorporated in the Williams analysis by reference to those
cases; or third, that the earlier cases stood because of their complete state
analysis and without a comparable analysis Williams is vulnerable to
Supreme Court reversal or, more likely, eventual overrule by a federal
decision.
The court's bald statement that the Washington constitution requires the
result does not appear to meet the Michigan v. Long formal requirements.
The Williams court cited only federal search and seizure cases, and the
court did not clearly state that the federal decisions were used for guidance
only. Justice Utter recently recommended that both lawyers and judges
should adopt terms and analytic methods that differ from those of the
United States Supreme Court in order to "avoid the danger that excessive
use of federal language may lead the federal courts to conclude that a
decision based on state grounds was in reality based in part on federal law
and, therefore, reviewable by the federal courts." ' 66 The Williams court
failed to heed this advice.
The state analysis in Williams thus appears inadequate to withstand
Supreme Court overrule. Each of the three earlier Washington decisions
dealt with a questionable search or seizure, but all were on different
questions within search and seizure law. 67 All three opinions properly
analyzed the application of case law in a particular area. Since Williams
covered a different application of article 1, section 7, complete analysis was
again called for, but was not presented. Moreover, Williams involved the
proper limits of a Terry stop, without probable cause for arrest; the previous
three decisions all involved a search or seizure incident to arrest with
probable cause. This factual difference further establishes the need for a full
analysis, including reference to State v. White, 68 in which the Washington
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

95 Wn. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980).
102 Wn. 2d at 741-42, 689 P.2d at 1070; see supra note 24.
Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3478 (1983);seesupra notes27-31 and accompanying text.
Utter, supra note 19, at 506.
See supra note 24.
97 Wn. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982).
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court considered the applicability of article 1, section 7 to a Terry stop.
Regardless of whether the analysis was sufficient, by basing it entirely on
federal precedent the court left the scope of a Terry stop in Washington
subject to future domination by federal case law.
The fourth concern regarding the value of Williams in the future is the
possible effect of the Ringer Committee. 69 The committee, formed at the
request of the Washington State Attorney General in response to the Ringer
decision, is recommending a constitutional amendment that would reword
article 1, section 7 so that it is identical to the fourth amendment, with a
further clause that henceforth Washington search and seizure law would be
identical to federal law. This would remove the precedential value of
Chrisman, Simpson, and Ringer, but the future of Williams would then
depend on future federal interpretation of Terry. The Williams decision has
added fuel to the Ringer Committee's fire, providing them with one more
instance of why the state should follow federal search and seizure law.
Beryl N. Simpson

69. The Ringer Committee was formed at the request of the Washington State Attorney General,
with the concurrence of the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys and the Legal Advisors
Division of the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs. It consists of one assistant
attorney general, deputy prosecutors from five counties, and legal advisers from Seattle and Bellevue
Police Departments. Its avowed purpose is to nullify the independent state grounds decisions on search
and seizure law in Washington. See Ringer Committee Recommendation (copy on file with the
Washington Lav Review).
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